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Not an abstract discussion! What seemed exceedingly abstract only a few days ago has now become a very tangilbe matter: what to do about Libya? What to do about Bahrain, Syria? Every one of the so-called Great Powers ––America, Canada, the EU, BRICs–– has to take a stance on Libya. It’s a battle between realists and liberals! Read the following statements and analyze whether they come from a LIBERAL o REALIST perspective. In each case, briefly state the opposing argument. Most answers are obvious; but the point of this discussion is to remember that great powers sometime have to take dramatic decisions in a matter of … days.
Background info: Libya and oil. Map of oil and gas resources. Before the crisis, Libya produced 1.58 million barrels of oil per day, about 2% of global oil supplies. Oil price rose sharply [chart]. However, Opec’s spare capacity stands at about 4.7m b/d — a comfortable cushion. A contagion scenario affecting production in Algeria, Oman, Yemen and Bahrain would see prices skyrocket to about $150-$220/barrel. Were unrest to hit Saudi Arabia, the spike could be sharper. And that would mean a very sharp worldwide recession.
[1] “If Col Gaddafi’s regime wins its civil war, consider the next phase. There will be more massacres and refugees. What then? Indefinite containment and sanctions on a pariah state endowed with wealth, pathological leadership and experience in state use of clandestine terror networks An objective can be stated simply: Col Gaddafi out of power”. (Philip Zelikow: “Only a no-drive zone can stop Gaddafi’s forces now”, Financial Times, March 26). Counsellor of the US Department of State, 2005-2007.
[2] “Absolute monarchies in the Arab world will need to contemplate constitutional monarchy and power sharing of they are to survive” (David Gardner: “And so to chapter two of the great Arab awakening”, Financial Times, March 20).
[3] “America has little strategic interest in north Africa but a lot at stake in the Gulf”. (Quoted by David Gardner: “And so to chapter two of the great Arab awakening”, Financial Times, March 20).
[4] “Hosni Mubarak kept conflicts at bay; authoritarian regimes in the region are the only alternative to chaos or radical Islam”. (Quoted by Roula Khalaf: “Making history in the street”, Financial Times, March 27).
[5] “In the region, 60% of the population is under 25; they have the internet, and they are aware of the things that happen around the world”. (Quoted by Roula Khalaf: “Making history in the street”, Financial Times, March 27).
[6] “Mohamed El-Baradei, Nobel laureate and opposition figure: they [the networked generation] know that nothing will change in terms of social justice and economic demands except through democracy”. (Quoted by Roula Khalaf: “Making history in the street”, Financial Times, March 27). [ElBaradei video].
[7] “Western powers are nervous about being sucked into a third war in an Islamic country after the painful experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq”. (Quoted by David Gardner: “And so to chapter two of the great Arab awakening”, Financial Times, March 20).
[8] “Mr Cameron is plainly guided by moral conviction; but this is a dangerous indulgence for a leader facing so many problems at home”. (Max Hastings: “Why the military is right to fret over Libya”, Financial Times, March 25).
[9] “Should this commitment expand any longer in terms of cost, time or intensity, I do think it’s important for Congress to be consulted and included in the decision-making process”. (Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat member of the Senate foreign relations committee, quoted by Richard McGregor: “Obama struggles for clarity in messy conflict”, Financial Times, March 25).
[10] “The main matter in the Middle East: managing Egypt’s democratic transition, and the Gulf, where a crackdown on Bahrain threatens to exacerbate Shia-Sunni tensions”. (Richard McGregor: “Obama struggles for clarity in messy conflict”, Financial Times, March 25).
[11] “We cannot be sure whether what we are seeing is a genuine democratic revolution; repression could rule the day. Anarchy, civil war, harsh police states, sectarianism, and severe Islamic rule are all potential alternatives to the sort of authoritarian regimes that have recently dominated the region. All of those outcomes are possible; none is likely to lead to greater freedom. Overall, we must be realistic about what to expect from a small degree of democratization. Immature or partial democracies are vulnerable to being hijacked by populists or extreme nationalists. A Middle East more influenced by public opinion could well be less willing to work against terrorism, or on behalf of peace with Israel. It is likely to be no more of a partner when it comes to providing oil at reasonable prices”. (Richard Haass: “How to read the second Arab awakening”, Financial Times, March 9). [video]. President, Council on Foreign Relations.
[12] “The Syria/Iran/Hizballah axis is a huge benefit to Iran and ending it would weaken Iran’s position greatly. Syria is Iran’s only ally in the Arab world and its land bridge to Hizballah. Recent reports of an Iranian naval facility in the Mediterranean reminded us of how valuable an asset Syria is today for Iran. If a Sunni-led Syria (and the country is 74% Sunni) ended the Asad regime’s romance with the ayatollahs, American interests in the entire Middle East would gain. Hizballah’s power in Lebanon would diminish instantly and the opposition to Hizballah—the March 14 movement, and Lebanon’s Sunni, Christian, and Druze communities—would grow stronger. Iran’s ability to threaten Israel would diminish if it lost what amounts to a land border with Israel through Lebanon’s Hizballah-controlled south. Moreover, every time a Middle Eastern tyranny falls, and especially so in the case of the tyranny most closely linked to Iran, it makes Iran’s own terrorist regime seem more outdated and anomalous in a Middle East where democracy is spreading.” (Elliott Abrams: “Syria, Iran, and American Interests”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 26).
[13] “For Moscow, the unrest in the Arab world is oddly double-edged. The resulting spike in oil prices has boosted Russia’s economy. On the face of it, the turmoil is a boon for Russia’s resource-dependent economy, taking oil prices close to the $120 a barrel in recent weeks. Economists say the increased prices could lift economic growth by 1 percentage point this year to at least 5%, the highest since 2008. Alexei Kudrin, finance minister, said in Monday that Russia’s budget deficit —built up through heavy spending during the financial crisis— would be eradicated if oil averaged $115 this year. Every $10 increase in the average price of crude oil swells Russia’s revenues by $20bn. That calculus underlie Moscow’s decision to abstain at the UN Security Council on Resolution 1973. Yet the Kremlin is watching uneasily the Middle East backlash against authoritarianism, corrupt and wealthy leaderships. ‘There is a sort of nervousness here that no one has observed before’, said an experienced foreign banker. ‘People are worried about contagion’. The oil windfall could restore Russia’s pre-crisis complacency, tempting it to backtrack on much needed corruption and reducing the state’s role in the economy. Polls suggest support for President Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, prime minister, remains at about 70%. But there have been signs of official jitters. (Catherine Bolton & Neil Buckley: “Russia in dilemma on Arab unrest”, Financial Times, March 16).
[14] “On Monday, officials were confronted with a rare moment of open disagreement between the two men who run the country. Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin issued a lacerating critique of the allied attacks on Libya — the kind of protest that accompanied Western interventions in Iraq and Kosovo. President Dmitri A. Medvedev, who had articulated a more pro-Western position, rebuked his mentor, calling Mr. Putin’s language unacceptable.” Ellen Barry: “Leaders’ Spat Tests Skills of Survival in the Kremlin”, The New York Times, March 2011.
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